Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist

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I appreciated the interest in some of my ideas, and I hope that the good publicity has favorable spillover effects on the business school. We had a delightful lunch at his apartment in Santiago [10 May] … and I got a very interesting fifteen minute summary of Chilean history, which I thoroughly enjoyed.

Indeed, Levy and Peart , pp. DeMartino and Levy and Peart are similarly critical of what they view as the antidemocratic implications of the way in which Friedman sought to justify his involvement with Chile. He presents a possible change. By contrast, Buchanan's involvement with Pinochet's Chile has been largely ignored until relatively recently see, e.

Equality, Justice, and Freedom: A Constitutional Perspective

In particular, Buchanan regularly visited Chile p. Buchanan's involvement with Chile—and reported provision of economic advice to Pinochet's Junta—is highly surprising. For one thing, Buchanan repeatedly argued that voters have an ultimate veto over any suggested policy change see, e. Similarly, Buchanan was far from happy with the readiness with which his economist colleagues e. Consequently, this article evaluates whether Buchanan provided the Junta with policy advice see, e.

Constitutional Economics, Constitutional Money

Section 3 provides an account of the analytical substance of Buchanan's May lectures. In particular, the evidence shows that Buchanan provided his various Chilean audiences e. Section 4 briefly assesses whether Buchanan's views had much influence on Chile's late s adoption of binomial representation.

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Section 5 assesses whether Buchanan's views had any substantive influence upon the drafting of the Constitution. Chile is one such country. We have planned as a first date for the seminar and for your visit, May To what groups would you like me to talk, and on what general topic. As you may know, the Chilean government is at the present time elaborating a new Constitution which will define our future republican life.

A copy of Buchanan's final schedule can be found in the Buchanan Archives. El Mercurio also published a fairly basic outline of Buchanan's schedule May 6, p. Buchanan's May 5 schedule began with an a. Buchanan visited the Chilean Naval Academy on May 6 and gave a 2. Buchanan's May 8 schedule included a a. Buchanan's May 8 visit to the University of Chile was canceled. Indeed I enjoyed the whole of my visit to Chile, and I learned a great deal. I hope you will initiate, with this first step, a program of periodic visits to our country.

Sincerely yours [etc.

Unfortunately, the Buchanan Archives do not shed much light on the background to Buchanan's visit to Portugal. I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments relating to the potential similarities between Buchanan's visit to Portugal and his visit to Chile. The 25th Anniversary of Business School. Fad in Europe now. Relevant to Chile. Italians [deleted] … Different rules, different results … Modify procedures Calculus of Consent How [to] limit government fiscal exploitation of taxpayers? How to design, implement, and change—rules [double underline]—basic institutions, arrangements. The Chilean media were particularly interested in Buchanan's views.

We don't say that every aspect of an individual's behavior is governed by purely economic motivations. What we do believe is that in all areas of human behaviour there is an economic [i. This perspective can offer additional clarity to the making of public decisions. A specific area of public choice that I study is the need for constitutional reforms … the constitution should limit the power of the government … eliminating the temptation to interfere … A concrete example is the need to constitutionally establish … a balanced budget.

In this way, each and every government is obliged to observe this rule, which is fundamental to economic freedom being maintained. If this is not so, political freedom becomes useless and has no meaning. Public finance origins. Simultaneous considerations. Unanimity rule in legislatures. Constitutional approach. Calculus of Consent Unfortunately, El Mercurio did not provide much substantive detail about the panel discussion which immediately followed Buchanan's May 8 talk. New York: Agathon Press.

Harsanyi, J. Hayek, F. Holmes, S. Constitutionalism and Democracy , pp. Hume, D. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.


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    Gwartney and R. Greenwich, Conn. Dye ed. The Political Legitimacy of Markets and Governments , 71— Legal Plunder. Dorn, J. Fairfax, Va.